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‘ULSTER LIKE ISRAEL CAN ONLY LOSE ONCE’:  
ULSTER UNIONISM, SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP, 1972-97. 
 
‘REBELS HAVE NO RIGHTS’1 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea that unionist political elites perceive themselves as representing a 
community which is ‘under siege’ and that their ideology reflects this position is 
regularly repeated in the literature.2  Unionists are not uncomfortable with this 
description.  Dorothy Dunlop, for example, is certainly not the only unionist politician 
to have defended herself against accusations of having a siege mentality by 
countering that ‘we are indeed under siege in Ulster.’3  A Belfast Telegraph editorial 
in 1989 talks of a unionist community ‘which feels under siege, both politically and 
from terrorism.’4  Cedric Wilson UKUP member of the Northern Ireland Forum said 
‘with regard to Mr. Mallon’s comments about Unionist’s being in trenches, I can think 
of no better place to be ... when people are coming at you with guns and bombs, the 
best place to be is in a trench.  I make no apology for being in a trench’5.  Yet despite 
this widespread use of the metaphor there have been few analyses of the specifics 
of unionism’s position on security, perhaps because the answers appear self-evident 
and the impact of unionists’ views on security on the prospects for a political 
settlement are not appreciated.6   
 
This paper examines how the position of unionist political elites on security affects 
and reflects their broader views on citizenship.  It begins by looking at the 
international literature on political conflict, which points towards a broader context for 
unionists’ political position.  The detail of unionism’s position on security will be 
examined under three broad headings.  It is necessary to begin by asking the basic 
question - who has laid ‘Ulster’ to siege, who are its enemies?  While this may seem 
obvious, unionist elites’ response to this question is actually complex and varied and 
at times even contradictory.  The ‘enemy’ has been variously described as ‘all 
Catholics’, ‘all Nationalists’, ‘all Republicans’ or simply the active supporters of the 
IRA (itself not a clear cut group).  Yet without a clear picture of who unionists reject 
                                                     
1
 Part of motion passed at UUUC meeting, Newtownards Spectator, 14 Mar. 1975. 
2e.g. Aughey (1989). 
3UUP Press Release, 29.9.80, Linen Hall Library Collection. 
4Belfast Telegraph, 18 Apr. 1989. 
5
 NI Forum, 4 Oct. 1996, vol. 12, p.44. 
6
 Galliher and DeGregory (1985) do look at the issue but it is limited in its scope and data set.  Analysis 
of newspaper coverage, for example, is limited to 1971. 
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as citizens it is impossible to know with whom Ulster unionists are prepared to 
engage in conflict resolving talks. 
 
Secondly, unionist political elites are practically unanimous in placing themselves 
within a model of citizenship which insists that it is the duty of every citizen to support 
the security forces of the state and indeed to accept as a duty service in those forces 
in certain circumstances. Finally the attitude of unionist political elites towards the 
British Government as the sovereign power and the controller of security is analysed. 
 
AN UNSETTLED STATE 
The ‘unsettled’ nature of the Northern Ireland state has been identified as a corner 
stone of the political conflict by many commentators.7  This has been a focus of the 
unionist analysis, across the full spectrum of elite opinion, over the past 25 years.  
Referring specifically to the annual renewal of Direct Rule, Enoch Powell MP 
comments ‘what would be the conclusion drawn by an ill-wisher of the Union ... if he 
saw that the Government’s acts were to insist on keeping the Province on an annual 
lease.’8 Bob McCartney argued in 1982  that ‘the acceptance by successive British 
Governments that some future majority in Northern Ireland may take us out of the 
United Kingdom is the root cause of our political instability.’9  Debates on the peace 
process in the Northern Ireland Forum in 1996/97 regularly returned to this form of 
analysis.  Antony Alcock of the UUP argued: ‘what do we learn from the past and 
from European experience?  First, that when the territorial destiny of an area is in 
doubt, there will be no peace’.10   Robert McCartney argued that the violence arising 
from Drumcree had to be seen in a context where the two Governments 
‘unrealistically raised the expectations of the minority community by a policy of 
appeasement and, by the same policy, eroded the confidence of the pro-Union 
majority that their place within the United Kingdom was safe’.11  This line of argument 
on the link between the unsettled nature of the state and political violence is often 
fairly generalised in its focus, but it is also found within two specific contemporary 
debates.   
 
Proposals by the Fianna Fail-Labour Irish Government in 1994 to amend Articles 2 
and 3 of the Irish Constitution, if a settlement could be reached in the North, in order 
                                                     
7The phrase is from Lustick (1993). 
8House of Commons, 16 May 1985, vol. 79, col.  524. 
9NI Assembly, 22 Nov. 1982, vol. 4, p.47. 
10
 NI Forum, 4 Oct. 1996, vol. 12, p.48. 
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to clarify that Irish unity would be sought by peaceful means and by consent were 
rejected by David Trimble as ‘worthless’12 and rejected in similar terms by the 
Cadogan Group (1995:46).13  They argued that it is the aspiration for Irish unity and 
not simply the means by which it is pursued which is fundamentally at the heart of 
the conflict.  To end the ‘unsettled’ nature of the state requires more that a 
commitment to seek a united Ireland only by consent and peaceful means.  It 
requires in Trimble’s terms that the Republic of Ireland and Northern nationalists 
abandon and forsake all hopes and aspirations for Irish unity entirely.14  The 
Cadogan Group argue that ‘if a genuine and lasting settlement is to be reached, the 
objective of Irish unity must be shelved.  The abandonment of Articles 2 and 3 will 
symbolise this change, but will not in itself be sufficient.  In practical terms this 
means that diplomatic and other pressures to undermine Northern Ireland’s status 
must cease’ (1995:46).  In a later pamphlet they continue: ‘nationalists in Northern 
Ireland must face the reality that continuing to campaign for Irish unity, or for joint 
authority, means there can be no settlement’(1996: 37).  Therefore an end to the IRA 
campaign and a unionist ‘veto’ over constitutional change are insufficient to create 
the conditions for a political settlement.  That can only happen when the boundaries 
of the state are fixed absolutely. 
 
A second element of this debate is seen in the attempts by the DUP and UKUP in 
particular (though not exclusively) to establish that the ‘British guarantee’ to 
unionists, not to force through constitutional change without the support of a majority 
in Northern Ireland is not limited to the question of the Border. They have argued that 
a wider range of issues must be covered by the ‘consent’ clause, such as police 
reform, the court system and equality legislation.15  The basis for this argument is 
that change in these areas is seen by mainstream unionism as undermining the state 
and paving the way for further change.  So, for example, Bob McCartney opposes 
economic co-operation by arguing that ‘arrangements are being made to create an 
economic infrastructure that would ultimately make the giving of ... consent to a 
united Ireland the only answer to economic destruction’.16 All three mainstream 
                                                                                                                                                        
11
 NI Forum, 13 Dec. 1996, vol. 22, p.24. 
12House of Commons, 14 July 1994, vol. 246, col.  1158. 
13
 Similar sentiments were expressed by Peter Weir, UUP in NI Forum, 7 Mar. 1997, vol. 31, p.44. 
14
 House of Commons, 27 Oct. 1994, vol. 248, col.  1072. 
15
 For example Ian Paisley, NI Assembly, 26 Mar. 1985, vol. 14, p.557-8. 
    Peter Robinson, NI Assembly, 8 October 1985, vol. 17, p.57. 
16NI Assembly, 22 Nov. 1982, vol. 4, p.48. 
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unionist parties focused on this issue in the Northern Ireland Forum17 and it was 
central to the UUP response to the framework document in 199518 and their entry to 
the September 1997 talks. 
 
It is this position of linking the issue of sovereignty with issues of justice and 
governance  which makes it difficult to separate rigidly different aspects of citizenship 
within the unionist viewpoint. Mainstream unionist elites make few distinctions 
between territorial aspects of sovereignty and the cultural, social and control 
elements.  They insist that there is little point having a veto on the ‘final handover’ of 
sovereignty if they cannot prevent political decisions which change the character of 
the state and/or which moves them towards a united Ireland.  It is this strong linkage 
of equality issues and constitutional issues which makes it impossible to premise the 
framework for a political settlement on the basis that mainstream unionists will 
compromise on ‘equality’ to secure the constitutional position. 
 
A HEGEMONIC VIEW 
These aspects of the  unionist analysis on the idea of an ‘unsettled state’ push the 
mainstream unionist position beyond simply acknowledging the obvious connection 
between disputed sovereignty and political conflict, towards a political position which 
sees the possibility of stability only when unionist elites regain a degree of 
hegemonic control similar in intensity, if not form, to that during the Stormont 
period.19  David Trimble’s statements on Articles 2 and 3, or the DUP’s position on 
consent, are not simply reflections of uncertainty but can be placed within a unionist 
discourse which seeks to re-establish the hegemonic position of unionism over 
nationalism.  There are numerous examples of this form of analysis across the 
spectrum of mainstream unionist opinion.20 
                                                     
17
 For example, Trevor Kirkland (DUP), 7 Mar. 1997, vol. 31, p.59. 
    Robert McCartney (UKUP), 7 Mar. 1997, vol. 31, p.29. 
    Antony Alcock (UUP), 7 Feb. 1997, vol. 27, p.21. 
18
 UUP Response to Frameworks for the Future, 1995. [on www.uup.org, 20 May 1997]. 
19
 e.g. Robert Bradford, House of Commons, 21 Mar. 1979, vol. 964, col.  1612. 
20
 It would be pointless to include a full range of quotations.  In addition to the examples in the 
following text other similar quotes can be found at: 
Ernest Baird, 9 Aug. 1974, Fortnight. 
Austin Ardill, 30 Oct. 1975, NI Convention, p.819. 
William Craig, 14 June 1976 , House of Commons, vol. 913, col.  80. 
Enoch Powell, 17 Dec. 1976, House of Commons, vol. 922, col.  968-70. 
William Ross 23 Feb. 1977, House of Commons, vol. 926, col.  1535. 
James Molyneaux, 23 Feb. 1977, House of Commons, vol. 926, col.  1542. 
William Craig, 6 Mar. 1978, House of Commons, vol. 945, col.  1083. 
Enoch Powell, 17 Jan. 1979, House of Commons, vol. 960, col.  1912. 
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James Molyneaux argued that ‘the key to success in the battle against terrorism is 
the denial of the expectation of victory.  The so-called guarantee ... is itself a cause 
of instability because it recognises the possibility of change’, while Trimble added, ‘to 
hold out the possibility of change is to encourage terrorism.’21 Antony Alcock 
(1994:143) of the UUP said ‘the first principle for action in dealing with terrorism [is] 
that if the greatest encouragement to terrorists is the prospect of victory, the greatest 
disincentive is the certainty of defeat’.  The possibility of success is not seen just in 
terms of IRA progress but also constitutional nationalist progress.  James Molyneaux 
attacked the idea of summits between the Irish and British governments on the basis 
that they ‘raise expectations and arouse fear - summits can kill.’22  The Cadogan 
Group argue that ‘policies which encourage minority aspirations for and expectations 
of constitutional change are destabilising’ (1996:36).  McCartney too argued that 
even entering talks was dangerous as ‘the Union cannot emerge from these talks 
stronger than when it entered’.23 
 
Any attempt to divert nationalism by offering concessions in the area of justice and 
equality is seen as simply strengthening the nationalist position.  For example Craig 
in 1974 argued that giving in to some of the civil rights demands proved to be 
disastrous: ‘the leaders of the minority, feeling that they had friends in court 
escalated their demands for change and this lead to the provocation of the 
Protestant community’.24 William Bleakes (UUP)  sees any sign of compromise as an 
invitation to rebellion.  Speaking in March 1985 he said ‘O’Neill ... wanted better 
community relations.  What happened?  This country was ablaze ... He took over in 
1961, when it was a prosperous country and the IRA had been defeated, and he 
started using language like that.  That is the language of a compromiser.’25 
 
Within this context there is little emphasis put on the degree of threat to the state.  All 
threats, all concessions, are fundamentally dangerous, as a united Ireland is more 
                                                                                                                                                        
William Ross 28 Apr. 1979, Northern Constitution. 
Robert Bradford, 11 Dec. 1979, House of Commons, vol. 975, col.  1181. 
Robert Bradford, 2 July 1981, House of Commons, vol. 7, col.  1057. 
James Kilfedder, 28 Apr. 1982, vol. 22, col.  908. 
Peter Weir (UUP), NI Forum, 7 Mar. 1997, vol. 31, col.  44. 
21
 James Molyneaux, House of Commons, 12 Mar. 1990, vol. 169, col.  61. 
    David Trimble, House of Commons, 5 July 1990, vol. 175, col. 1204. 
22
 Belfast Telegraph, 24 Nov. 1984. 
23
 NI Forum, 25 Oct. 1996, vol. 15, p.6. 
24
 House of Commons, 3 June 1974, vol. 874, col.  915. 
25
 NI Assembly, 26 Mar. 1985, vol. 14, p.583. 
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likely to come about by degree that by a single political decision.   Harold McCusker 
in a comment on the Sunningdale Agreement said it ‘was designed not to kick us out 
of the United Kingdom but to change our attitudes, to swing our gaze slowly from the 
centre of power we have always recognised as London towards Dublin and by a slow 
process, to change the attitude of the Loyalist people so that one day they might 
believe the myth of Irish unity which so bedevils many people in Northern Ireland.’26  
In a very similar vein 22 years later Robert McCartney, speaking about the peace 
process, argues that ‘there is no such thing in the Nationalist dictionary of concepts 
as a permanent settlement.  All settlements, all concessions, all agreements are 
merely staging posts in a process.  Nationalists are not interested in a settlement, 
they are interested only in generating a process that will ensure their ultimate 
objective of Irish unity’.27 
 
The Alliance Party sets itself apart from mainstream unionism on this issue.  While in 
agreement with the proposition that political uncertainty leads to political violence28 it 
argues that hegemonic control over nationalists in general is neither necessary or 
desirable and that nationalists as well as unionists must have some sense of 
ownership if a political settlement is to be built.29  Even the Alliance Party has, 
however, a hierarchical view of the citizen-rights and priorities of majority and 
minority communities.  While the constitutional status quo is seen as central, core 
and a bottom line for unionists; justice and equality (rather than constitutional 
change) are promoted as being the core of nationalist demands.30 Oliver Napier, 
presuming to know the mind of Catholics better than those they elect, said: ‘when 
most Catholics in Northern Ireland talk of an Irish Dimension, however their 
politicians may define it, that is what they mean.  Powersharing, equality of 
citizenship and equality of esteem for their own cultural tradition.’31  This has become 
central to the Alliance Party’s view of the ‘principle of consent’.  John Alderdice in 
1996 said ‘there are two sides to [consent].  The numerical majority of people in 
Northern Ireland must consent to its constitutional future.  That is absolutely crucial.  
                                                     
26
 House of Commons, 4 June 1974, vol. 874, col.  1108. 
27
 NI Forum, 25 Oct. 1996, vol. 15, p.6. 
28
 Lord Dunleath, Alliance News,  Nov. 1979. 
29
 John Cushnahan, Conference Speech 10 Apr. 1987, in Alliance News, May 1987;  
Similar views in Alliance News,  Feb. 1983 
30e.g. Robin Glendinning, Alliance News, Nov. 1980 
31
 Alliance News, Feb. 1983, my emphasis.  Similar analysis in Alliance News, Aug./Sept. 1979. 
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It is also important that the minority consent to the form of government that pertains 
in the province’.32 
 
Indeed it is this hierarchical view of rights and ideologies which frames Alliance’s 
view of citizenship in this area.  The Alliance Party’s promotion of fair treatment for 
nationalists is rooted in a very strong perception that such moves will reduce the 
intensity of nationalist alienation from the British state and thereby lead to increasing 
political stability.  Rather than threatening the state, parity of esteem should 
strengthen British sovereignty over Northern Ireland by developing a model of 
citizenship sufficiently pluralist to accommodate most individual nationalists.  All of 
this however is based on this fundamental assumption that political ideologies are of 
different intensities and that the nationalist community’s sense of ‘nationalism’ and 
their demand for political and ideological parity of esteem is of less importance that 
demands for justice and fair treatment. The Alliance position is also based on an 
assumption that mainstream unionism will allow such a development by drawing a 
distinction between the sovereignty issue and the question of status within Northern 
Ireland. 
 
ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 
The loss of hegemonic control by unionism in the late 1960s, followed quickly by the 
loss of direct political control in 1972, adds another dimension to unionists’ views on 
security.  Unionist political elites are reliant on the British Government to implement a 
security policy favourable to their position.   
 
Essentially since 1972 mainstream unionist elites have viewed the British 
Government with suspicion. There have been periodic alliances between the UUP 
and British Governments, for example in the last few years of the Major 
administration, and periods when unionism was optimistic about British intentions, 
such as after Thatcher’s ‘out, out, out’ press conference in November 1984.33  They 
have not, however, counter balanced the overall context of suspicion. 
 
A conflict in this situation has been characterised by Mack (1975) as ‘asymmetric’.  
For one side it is an all or nothing conflict while the other side may have options.  
The US could pull out of Vietnam with very little threat to their domestic position.  The 
                                                     
32
 NI Forum, 4 Oct. 1996, vol. 12, p.22, my emphasis.  Similar views were expressed in Alliance News 
Party Manifesto for May 1 Election 1997, [www.unite.net/customers/alliance, 30 April 1997] 
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South Vietnamese Government had no such luxury.  If they lost, their position was 
terminal.  Unionism has quite consciously analysed their position in this context.  For 
example the Orange Order, comparing Northern Ireland to Israel, said: ‘Having been 
betrayed before they [the Ulster people] are very alert now, for as Louis Gardner 
wrote, “Ulster, like Israel, can only lose once”.’34  In a very similar vein Clifford Smyth 
quotes an Admiral Hugo Hendrik Bierman of the then South African Navy: ‘in the 
nature of this protracted war our enemies have the opportunity to attack time and 
again and to lose, whereas we shall have but one opportunity to lose’.35 
 
Mainstream unionists clearly saw successive British Governments as being capable 
of negotiating a United Ireland without any significant threat to their own position, or 
to the rest of the British state.36  This view is expressed in various ways but generally 
emphasises that Northern Ireland is kept at arms length (Aughey: 1995a:14) or is 
treated differently from England, Scotland or Wales, both in a general sense and on 
specifics such as legislative procedures, exclusion orders etc.37  Jim Kilfedder MP 
and the DUP regularly drew attention to the record of the British Government in 
‘abandoning’ its supporters in settler colonies when it decided to withdraw.38  
Kilfedder always had a good turn of phrase on this issue.  For example he said, ‘all 
over the world where Britain has been kicked in the teeth by violence she has 
surrendered to the terrorists.  Northern Ireland ...is no exception’, and ‘Northern 
Ireland will not be treated as the Khyber Pass and the North West Frontier of the 
1970s, providing reminiscences for Ministers and for military mess dinners.’  In 
response to guarantees from British ministers about unionists’ position he retorted: 
‘were not such assurances given from these Dispatch Boxes to the unfortunate 
people of Kenya who were humiliated by the Mau-Mau ?  But subsequently those evil 
men were welcomed by politicians here who had earlier condemned them.’39 
                                                                                                                                                        
33
 Molyneaux, House of Commons, 20 Nov. 1984, vol. 68, col.  152. 
34
 Martin Smyth, Introduction to Orange Order pamphlet The Twelfth, 1982. 
35
 Protestant Telegraph, 15 June 1974. 
36
 British Conservative supporters of the unionist position do generally see a threat to the Union more 
generally if Northern Ireland leaves.  It is presumed that this would encourage moves towards Scottish 
and possibly Welsh independence, leaving Westminster to rule only a rump English state, with its own 
North-South divide.  Alcock (1994:106) does raise this issue. 
37
 For example Ian Paisley, House of Commons, 6 Mar. 1972, vol. 832, col.  1040. 
    James Kilfedder, House of Commons, 28 Nov. 1974, vol. 882, col.  842 and 6 Feb. 1976 Co. Down 
Spectator. 
    Enoch Powell, House of Commons, 10 Feb. 1987, vol. 110, col.  277. 
38
 Vanguard also uses this argument e.g. William Wright in East Antrim Times, 11 Apr. 1975 refers to 
Britain’s ‘Vietnam like retreat from Ulster’. 
39
 House of Commons, 28 Mar. 1972 vol. 834, col.  283; 7 Apr. 1977, vol. 929, col.  1390; 6 Mar. 
1978, vol. 945, col.  1003. 
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By far the most common analysis of the British Government position from unionist 
political elites is that the British Government has no will to win, that they either 
secretly want a united Ireland to rid themselves of an embarrassment40, or that they 
have a ‘guilt complex’41 about their treatment of Ireland through the ages, or at the 
very least they see no compelling reason to stay in the face of continuous 
international criticism. 
 
The absence of a clear will to win has been regularly expressed over the period.   
Molyneaux attacks the ‘lack of political will’ of successive British Governments to 
defeat the threat to the Union.42  Enoch Powell argued in 1976 that the British 
Government  
 
has never accepted the partition ... of Ireland ... it regards the status quo in 
Ireland as transitional ... the manner in which the United Kingdom continues to 
conduct its own affairs within its own territory is calculated ... to convey to those 
who wish to believe it that in the eyes of Her Majesty’s Government the status 
of Northern Ireland is equivocal and interim.43 
 
Ian Paisley in 1980 said that ‘the vast majority of the people of Northern Ireland no 
longer have any faith that this Government have the will to win the war against the 
IRA.’44   Ken Maginnis said the British Government could not be trusted to uphold the 
Union as they sought to ‘reassure’ unionists and then ‘disappear to connive with our 
committed enemies.’45  Ivan Foster argued that: ‘British security policy ... was 
intended to be a failure ... They never intended to defeat the IRA; rather what they 
have been seeking to do through this corrupt and criminal policy is to substantiate 
the claim by British Government lackeys that the IRA cannot be defeated.’46   Antony 
Alcock (1994:118 &142) said that ‘it is clear that the British Government wants Irish 
unity’ and that the British Government ‘have consistently feared offending Dublin and 
that has meant seeking to contain rather than defeat terrorism.’. 
                                                     
40Peter Robinson, NI Assembly, 30 Apr. 1986, vol. 19, p.295. 
41Ken Maginnis, Independent (London), 17 Sept. 1988. 
42House of Commons, 5 Dec. 1974, vol. 882, col.  1975. 
43House of Commons, 17 Dec. 1976, vol. 922, cols. 1970 & 1972. 
44House of Commons, 27 Oct. 1980, vol. 991, col.  62 and similar sentiments in the House of Commons 
9 July 1980, vol. 988, col.  587.  Also Peter Robinson in NI Assembly, 13 Feb. 1985, vol. 13, p.391.  
Similar views from Jim Allister and Alan Kane in the same debate p.444 and p.432 respectively. and 
Ian Paisley Irish News, 21 Mar. 1989. 
45NI Assembly, 22 Nov. 1982, vol. 4, p.65. 
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Peter Robinson in the aftermath of the IRA cease-fire of 1994 said that he believed 
that 
 
the British Government’s policy is based on a false premise - the idea that 
ultimately the people of Northern Ireland will go into a United Ireland.  There is 
no sound reason for believing that.  The whole strategy of this Government is 
based on the idea that some time, somewhere down the road, the people of 
Northern Ireland will not want to be part of the United Kingdom.  That is why 
Northern Ireland is not governed in the same way as other parts of the United 
Kingdom are.  It is why Northern Ireland is the detachable part of the United 
Kingdom.47 
 
The debates in the Northern Ireland Forum showed further support for this 
perspective from the mainstream unionist and loyalist parties.  Iris Robinson refers to 
the British Government having the resources but not the will to defeat insurrection.48  
Ian Paisley jnr. argues that ‘everything that the [British] Government have done, 
everything they have laid their hand to has been designed to weaken the Union.49  
Robert McCartney says that  
 
 increasingly one is driven to the conclusion that the British Government do 
not believe that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom or that its 
people are in truth British citizens.  Being a British citizen is very different 
from being a British subject.  A citizen is one who forms part of the civil and 
political society of which governments must take note.  A subject, on the 
other hand, is merely one of those who are governed and whose rights a 
government might in future dispose of, as in Northern Ireland or Hong 
Kong.50 
 
Derek Hussey of the UUP argues that ‘from Lloyd George to the present successive 
British Government’s have been intent on uniting Ireland.51 Gary McMichael of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
46NI Assembly, 10 Nov. 1983, vol. 7, p.872. 
47House of Commons, 27 Oct. 1994, vol. 248, col.  1061. 
48
 NI Forum, 6 Sept. 1996, vol. 8, p.54. 
49
 NI Forum, 4 Oct. 1996, vol. 12, p.45. 
50
 NI Forum, 25 Oct. 1996, vol. 15, p.5.  In the same speech (p.4) McCartney refers to the British 
Governments ‘own Community Relations Council - hardly a pro-Union organisation’. 
51
 NI Forum, 15 Nov. 1996, vol. 18, p.38. 
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UDP says that ‘it is an inclination of British establishment policy to keep Northern 
Ireland at arms length lest it poison the body politic of Great Britain’ and he also 
refers to the pressures of ‘international legitimacy’ leading to a greater Irish 
Government role being conceded by Britain.52  Jack McKee (DUP) argues that the 
‘British Government have neither the will nor the determination to defeat terrorism in 
Northern Ireland’.53  Robert McCartney, finally, explains this position, saying that ‘the 
great problem that the British Government have faced for the last 25 years is that 
they have a political policy directed towards withdrawal and are faced with the 
position that an effective security policy would frustrate their own political 
objectives’.54 
 
This view of the British Government leads mainstream unionist elites to define their 
loyalty to the British state in qualified terms.  This has been most famously discussed 
by David Miller (1978) in Queens Rebels and is reflected in Robert Bradford’s 
famous speech in the House of Commons where he argued that ‘if we [unionists] are 
to survive at all [we] will have to say that we will become Queens rebels.’55  However 
this view was most prominent in unionist discourse in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement of 1985, when the idea of ‘governing without consent’ was central to a 
wide range of unionist statements and was as strong within the UUP as the DUP.  
For example Ken Maginnis said: ‘The [British] Government has placed us in a 
position where we have no alternative but to confront it head on by withdrawing 
consent.’56  Harold McCusker of the UUP called on unionists to ‘deny the Stormont 
Castle regime the moral authority to govern us by the withdrawal of our consent and 
presence from all institutions of the state.’57  William McCrea said that unionists ‘may 
even yet have to fight the British to remain British.’58  The joint UUP-DUP manifesto 
in May 1987 says that ‘the people of this Province gave us a mandate to withdraw 
our consent from the institutions which betrayed them, thereby denying Government 
the moral authority to implement the [Anglo-Irish] Agreement’.59   
 
At this time only the Alliance Party disputed this vision of unionism, arguing that the 
mainstream unionist position put them on a ‘confrontation course with the Sovereign 
                                                     
52
 NI Forum, 29 Nov. 1996, vol. 20, p.15. 
53
 NI Forum, 17 Jan. 1997, vol. 24, p.25. 
54
 NI Forum, 17 Jan. 1997, vol. 24 p.17. 
55House of Commons, 2 July 1979, vol. 969, col.  1035. 
56Newsletter, 13 Feb. 1986. 
57Newsletter, 27 Jan. 1987.  Other examples include Peter Smith, Newsletter 3 Feb. 1987. 
58Newsletter, 13 Feb. 1986. 
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Parliament’60 and questioning how they can remain loyal while rejecting the 
overwhelming will of the British Parliament.  Alliance also argue that the unionist 
withdrawal of consent and protests weakened the Union by alienating support in 
Britain.61   
 
Aughey (1995a) defends this conditional loyalty as a quite proper extension of the 
Lockian idea of contract with government.  If the British Government breach the 
contract by failing to defend the citizenry or by involving non-citizens in the affairs of 
government then  citizens can withdraw their consent to be governed.  Aughey 
(1995a:13) argues that ‘it is not Ulster unionists who are conditionally loyal to the 
British state but British governments themselves that have been only conditionally 
loyal to the idea of the union’.  The difficulty with Aughey’s defence is that his ‘idea’ 
of the state can only provide an adequate defence of conditional loyalty from 
unionists if you define citizenship in such a way as not to require allegiance to 
centralised state sovereignty.  This would place support for the constitutional position 
on the same level as disagreements with the British Government over the poll tax, or 
the route of a motorway.  Yet fundamental to Aughey’s approach is a rejection of any 
definition of ‘parity of esteem’ to include a recognition of nationalists’ ‘right’ to reject 
British sovereignty and/or which subscribes to the incorporation of nationalists’ 
political and ideological position within the state ethos (1995b:50), while defending 
the right of unionists to withhold consent from the state if the dominance of their 
power and ethos is challenged.  Ultimately, however Aughey frames it, conditional 
loyalty is fundamentally self-serving for mainstream unionism.  It serves to uphold 
unionism dominance and lend philosophical credibility to a unionist position which 
opposes the British state when its interests are threatened, as in its opposition to the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement or its strategy over Drumcree in July 1996.  The view of 
citizenship being used here is a hierarchical one emphasising the rights of loyal 
citizens over disloyal nationalists.  Consent is withdrawn from the sovereign because 
the sovereign seeks to weaken the state support for loyal citizens over the disloyal. 
This argument from Aughey draws on ideas of citizenship which are more in keeping 
with a Scottish tradition of covenant than the liberal individualism of Locke who 
Aughey quotes in his defence, and in this at least David Miller’s analysis in Queen’s 
Rebels  is correct. 
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Ulsterisation of Security 
The common policy response by unionists to this situation of perceived asymmetric 
conflict is to demand the return of security to ‘Ulster’ hands thereby creating once 
again a ‘symmetrical’ conflict.  The majority preference would be for control of 
security in a new unionist government62 but failing this most would see the effective 
primacy of locally recruited security forces commanded by local officers as a good 
second best.  Trimble for example says ‘the IRA will only be defeated when they see 
that their ultimate goal is unattainable.  That day will only come when the IRA see the 
control of security in the hands of Ulstermen, because the Provos know Ulstermen 
cannot afford to run away from the situation.’63 
 
Peter Robinson argued in 1974 for the return of Ulster control over security as 
Ulstermen would fight to the ‘last ditch’.64   Even the pro-power sharing UPNI insisted 
that ‘security must be controlled by Ulster people.’65  Robert Bradford emphasised 
the hegemonic importance of Ulsterisation of security: ‘the will to win will emerge 
only when Ulster politicians have the right and the possibility of taking security 
decisions in their own parliament.66  David Calvert (DUP) argued that ‘it is only when 
Ulstermen have power over our security forces that we will see a change, for it is 
only they who have the real determination to win the war against the IRA.67  Ian 
Paisley said in 1982 that ‘only those who are fighting for their homes can really fight 
for their country.’68  Two years later he returned to this theme, arguing that ‘we did 
beat terrorism for almost 50 years ... because we had a government that was 
determined to beat terrorism and because the people fighting terrorism had a stake 
in this land.  When you are fighting for your home, when you are fighting for your 
heritage and when you are fighting for your family, by the grace of god you will 
                                                     
62
 e.g. Robert Bradford, House of Commons, 21 Mar. 1979, vol. 964, col.  1612. 
Unionist task force report (Irish Times, 3 July 1987). 
63
 Newsletter, 17 Aug. 1987. 
64
 Newsletter, 26 Nov. 1974. 
also e.g. Ian Paisley House of Commons, 20 Mar. 1972, vol. 833, col.  1131. 
Stratton-Mills, House of Commons, 14 July 1972, vol. 840, col.  2164. 
Brian Faulkner, Irish News, 29 May 1973. 
Harry West, Coleraine Chronicle, 4 May 1974. 
William Ross, House of Commons, 9 July 1974, vol. 876, col.  1234. 
Clifford Smyth, 18 June 1975, NI Convention, p.263. 
Jim Kilfedder, House of Commons, 23 Feb. 1977, vol. 926, col. 1533. 
 
65Viscount Brookeborough, NI Convention, 23 Oct. 1975, p.773. 
66
 House of Commons, 9 July 1980, vol. 988, col.  647. 
67
 NI Assembly, 22 Nov. 1982, vol. 4, p.73. 
68NI Assembly, 7 Dec. 1982, vol. 4, col.  342. 
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fight’.69  Raymond Ferguson of the UUP, certainly not a politician in the mould of 
Paisley, also argued that ordinary unionists would not feel secure until control of 
security was returned to Ulster hands.70 
 
It has not been an issue in public debate since the late 1980s but there is no reason 
to believe that mainstream unionists have changed their mind on this issue. It seems 
more likely that the return of control over security is such a remote possibility at 
present that other issues have been more pressing and have been pursued on 
pragmatic grounds.  The integrationist argument has been presented, not as an act 
of faith in the British Government, but rather as a means of re-establishing the 
unionist hegemonic position on the constitutional future, ruling out any possibility of 
change, which mainstream unionism believes would demoralise and help defeat the 
nationalist and republican challenge to the state.  This would fit in with Jim 
Molyneaux’s effective integrationist strategy during his tenure as UUP leader, while 
never publicly challenging their stated policy position on devolution.  Certainly there 
are no significant unionists statements to contradict their earlier views   
 
The Alliance Party has opposed the return of the control of security to Northern 
Ireland for as long as this would lead to the RUC being used as a ‘political football’71 
and this would be the case even in the early period of a power-sharing government.72  
Alliance’s perspective on the British Government’s strategy does not place the 
conflict in an ‘asymmetric’ model.  In contrast to the mainstream unionist position 
they believe the British Government (and indeed usually the Irish Government) to be 
pursuing a strategy to defeat the IRA.  For example they view the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement as having been constructed ‘not as a capitulation to IRA violence but for 
the totally opposite reasons which were to undermine support for IRA violence and to 
isolate that organisation to a point where it could be more effectively dealt with under 
the law including the use of increased security co-operation between the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland’.73  Alliance have regularly attacked mainstream 
unionist calls for return of security control to unionist hands and for the type of more 
aggressive security strategies they would presumably use if they got such control as 
being counter-productive and more likely to lead to increased support for the IRA.74 
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 NI Assembly, 17 Oct. 1984, vol. 11, p.357. 
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 Sunday Tribune, 7 Sept. 1986. 
71Alliance News, July/Aug. 1973. 
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 Alliance News, Oct. 1988. 
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The mainstream unionist position on security can therefore be placed within a 
number of international contexts.  It is an ‘unsettled state’ and the British 
Government  is seen as an unreliable ally in the defence of unionist interests.  
Unionists see all concessions to nationalists as working to increase nationalist power 
and reduce unionist power.  Unionists therefore wish to rule out the possibility of 
constitutional change and to regain effective control over security in order to recreate 
a symmetry of interests between the state forces and their enemies.   It is this 
context which frames mainstream unionists’ views on citizenship.  It is a citizenship 
model which stresses the protection of the state and loyalty to the constitutional 
status quo. A clear distinction is drawn between loyal-citizens and disloyal-enemies. 
The differentiated nature of citizenship is strongly exclusionary.  Citizens need to 
band together to face a common enemy.  The enemies of the state need to be 
excluded from these citizenship rights to protect the state by drawing a clear 
demarcation between citizen and enemy.  It is crucial therefore to define who 
precisely unionists count among their enemies, what the dividing line is, and how 
rigid the distinction is. 
 
Who are the Enemy ? 
Mainstream unionist opinion on the question of who are seen as subversive to their 
position is varied and contradictory.  There has been a consistent if often vague line 
of argument that many or even most Catholics are pro-Union, or at least that they do 
not support the IRA campaign and that they are more ‘moderate’ than the leadership 
of northern nationalism in the SDLP and Sinn Féin75.  Paisley in 1996 argues that 
‘the majority of people [in Northern Ireland] including many Roman Catholic’s want to 
be part of the Union’.76  While David Trimble and Jim Molyneaux have on many 
occasions said that the ‘greater number’ of people in Northern Ireland, including 
many Catholics support the Union77. 
 
                                                     
75
 Other examples in addition to those cited in the text include: 
Stanley McMaster, House of Commons, 17 Apr. 1973, vol. 855, col.  437. 
Harold McCusker, House of Commons, 30 June 1982, vol. 26, col. 954. 
Ken Maginnis, House of Commons, 20 Dec. 1984, vol. 70, col.  616. 
Jim Kilfedder, House of Commons, 6 May 1987, vol. 115, col.  788. 
76
 NI Forum, 6 Sept. 1996, vol. 8, p.2. 
77
 e.g. Jim Molyneaux, 19 Nov. 1996, speech to Friends of the Union [www.uup.org 20 May 1996].  
           David Trimble, 22 Mar. 1997, speech to AGM of UUP [on www.uup.org 20 May 1996]. 
 also Trimble in Ulster Review, Autumn 1996, published by the UUP says that 25-40% of 
Roman  Catholics want to remain part of the UK. 
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This vague idea of a silent loyal Roman Catholic grouping is however overwhelmed 
by the huge number of unionist statements which are clear cut in extending the 
definition of subversive to the entire nationalist community (or even Catholic 
community). The Independent Orange Order in 1973 said it had no sympathy for 
Catholic civilians injured by Loyalist paramilitaries as the entire Catholic community 
must ‘share the blame equally [for IRA violence].’78  Stanley McMaster (UUP) argues 
that ‘everyone who lives here [Northern Ireland] must owe allegiance to the Queen.  
If not, people can only be described as aspiring to ends which are treasonable’.79 
Alan Kane of the DUP says Catholics support the IRA ‘to a large extent.’80  Ian 
Paisley in 1994 said he could not ‘trust the future of Ulster to any Roman Catholic 
and I say that unashamedly’.81   
 
Ivan Foster further argues that while nationalists support the IRA campaign to 
different degrees most do in some way, 
 
 the Ulster problem in reality is rebellion by a small band of cut-throats whose 
only skill is in the latest techniques of cowardly murder.  These cut-throats 
are ... supported by a sizeable proportion of the Nationalist minority and 
because their tactics, aims and objectives strike a sympathetic chord in the 
hearts of all nationalists the cut throats have never been fully and 
unequivocally condemned and rejected by the political and religious leaders 
of the nationalist people.  The Ulster problem is a rebellion supported in 
various degrees by the nationalist people.82 
 
David Trimble outlines a similar line of argument.  Describing ‘republican terrorism’ 
as a ‘high status, low risk occupation’ he goes on to say that ‘we can do nothing to 
lower its status because its status is conferred on it by the community in which it 
operates’.83  Ken Maginnis (UUP) focuses on the relatively high rates of transfers 
under PRSTV between the SDLP and Sinn Féin to argue that 85% of nationalists 
lend support to the IRA campaign.84  David Brewster (UUP) in a similar argument 
said that the willingness of nationalists to shift their vote tactically to Martin 
                                                     
78Irish Times, 2 Feb. 1973 
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 House of Commons, 24 May 1973, vol. 857, col.  768. 
80NI Assembly, 7 Dec. 1982, vol. 4, p.338. 
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 Irish Times, 19 Feb. 1994. 
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McGuinness to defeat Willie McCrea of the DUP in the May 1997 election shows an 
ambiguity in all nationalists towards the IRA.85  David Trimble in 1991 quotes as a 
form of precedent the practice of treating all ‘enemy aliens’ as suspects during 
wartime.86  The fact that some ‘aliens’ may sympathise with their host country was 
outweighed by the strategic and security imperative, and so all enemy aliens are 
treated as suspect.  The implication is that all nationalists are seen as a threat just as 
all enemy aliens were.   
 
Occasionally there is a distinction made between Sinn Féin voters and other 
nationalists which is qualified by unionists in terms of their incapacity to accurately 
identify the Sinn Féin supporters.  Robert McCullough (UUP) for example says ‘three 
out of every seven nationalists voted for Sinn Féin at the last general election [1983].  
It would be very difficult if you met seven of these people to know which three would 
gun you down’.87  John Taylor also used this logic when discussing fair employment, 
saying that since so many nationalists voted for Sinn Féin employers, would be 
reluctant to employ any nationalists.88  However, mainstream unionists’ treatment of 
nationalists in a relatively undifferentiated way cannot be explained solely in a 
context of ‘playing safe’ in order to isolate Sinn Féin supporters.  At the level of 
political elites, where SDLP and Sinn Féin members are clearly known and 
identifiable, mainstream unionism excludes the SDLP from full citizenship by treating 
them essentially as ‘enemies’. 
 
The SDLP: Citizens or Enemies? 
Clearly in practice unionists do distinguish between the SDLP and Sinn Féin in their 
rhetoric, their attitude to formal talks, appearances on TV programmes etc. However 
in terms of their capacity to include nationalists fully within the body politic 
mainstream unionists emphasise the commonality of all nationalists.  From the early 
1970s to the present the SDLP have been characterised as ‘republicans’ and 
subversives 89 and are therefore unacceptable to mainstream unionism as partners 
in government just as more militant republicans are.90 
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 RTE Radio One, election coverage 2 May 1997, 3.40 pm. 
86House of Commons, Standing Committee B, 22 Jan. 1991, col. 177. 
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 NI Assembly, 21 Nov. 1984, vol. 12, p.241. 
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 House of Commons, NI Committee, 16 May 1991, col.  14. 
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William Douglas (UUP), 25 Jan 1975, Northern Constitution. 
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William Ross in 1976 said that the SDLP only refuses to support the IRA because 
the IRA was losing and if the IRA was winning ‘the SDLP would be riding on their 
backs’.91  Willie McCrea said the SDLP’s hands ‘are soiled by their links with terrorist 
organisations and by their sympathies for the IRA.’92  William Bleakes for the UUP 
said ‘the Protestant people of this country do not see much difference between Mr 
Hume’s brand of politics and republicanism and the Sinn Féin brand of 
republicanism.’93  Frank Miller (Ind.) said the SDLP are ‘just as vile a republican 
element as the Sinn Féin movement’, and that he did not think ‘there is any 
difference between the SDLP and Sinn Féin’.94   William Ross (UUP) too said there 
is no difference between the SDLP and Sinn Féin.95 as did David Calvert for the 
DUP.96  David Trimble said that the complementary activity of the IRA and 
constitutional nationalists ‘cannot be just a coincidence’ and that ‘violent nationalists 
and so-called constitutional nationalists are following the same game plan.’97  
Sammy Wilson, in 1988, said the SDLP have ‘renounced constitutional politics’ by 
talking to Sinn Féin.98  James Speers (UUP) said: ‘there is only one significant 
difference [between constitutional nationalist politicians and the IRA].  The IRA 
shoots people whereas the republican politicians try to strangle them.  The end result 
is the same’.99   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Willie McCrea, House of Commons, 2 Dec. 1983, vol. 49, col.  1154; 26 June 1985, vol. 81, col.  1016; 
1 Mar. 1988, vol. 128, col.  910; NI Assembly 25 May 1983 vol. 6, p.703. 
Jim Allister, NI Assembly, 10 May 1983, vol. 6, p.383. 
Alan Kane, NI Assembly, 15 Nov. 1983 vol. 7, p.914; 13 Feb. 1985, vol. 12 p.631. 
Ivan Foster, 22 May 1984, vol. 10, col.  297. 
William Beattie (UUP), 6 June 1984, vol. 10, p.474. 
Jack McKee, 21 Nov. 1984, vol. 12, p.230; Belfast Telegraph, 26 Jan. 1985. 
Frank Miller (Ind), 26 Mar. 1985, vol. 14 p.591. 
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93NI Assembly, 10 May 1983. 
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Mainstream unionist comment on the peace process of the 1990s has been argued 
in similar terms in the widespread use of phrases such as ‘the pan-nationalist front’ 
or pan-nationalist strategy100 to emphasise the common threat from the SDLP and 
Sinn Féin or launch attacks on the two parties.  Both Trimble and Molyneaux used 
the phrase ‘pan-nationalist front’.101  Antony Alcock (1994:96) said ‘there are no 
meaningful differences between the various forms of Irish nationalism ... although 
the SDLP denounces PIRA violence unionists note that moderate nationalists are 
often the beneficiaries, and to the extent that they gain on the backs of the IRA, 
there really is a “pan-nationalist” front’.  Molyneaux in 1996 uses the phrase to 
analyse nationalist strategy since 1972.102   William Carrick (DUP) said that the 
SDLP give ‘passive support’ to the IRA campaign.103  Peter Weir (UUP) argued that 
‘the SDLP has ridden on the backs of the IRA for a quarter of a century and has 
advanced the nationalist cause by proxy violence.  For years, the SDLP strategy was 
to use violence for its own benefit’.104  Eric Smyth of the DUP repeats the claim that 
there is no difference between the SDLP and Sinn Féin.105  Robert McCartney 
argues that ‘the SDLP, Sinn Féin, the IRA and the Irish Government have a common 
objective: not only ultimately to obtain Irish unity but to keep Northern Ireland in a 
state of permanent political instability so that the only conceivable option for ending 
that instability is Irish unity’.106   David Brewster of the UUP returns to the idea of a 
common strategy by the SDLP and Sinn Féin: ‘his [John Hume’s] game plan requires 
the sacrifice periodically of the SDLP [Joe Hendron’s seat] so he can go to London 
and say “help my party, we are suffering.  We are about to be overtaken by Sinn 
Féin” ’.  This is dishonest.  This is the kind of incestuous relationship that Parnell had 
with the land leagues in the nineteenth century.  There was a secret relationship 
between them and he said to them - go ahead so far only not too much’.107  Trevor 
Kirkland (DUP) also argues that there is a commonality of strategy.  ‘I believe that 
neither John Hume or Seamus Mallon is actually dedicated exclusively to democratic 
procedures.  The SDLP, Sinn Féin and the IRA all share the same objective.  The 
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question is how is that objective to be achieved?  And to achieve that objective they 
also share the same ideas’.108 
 
The point of including such a wide range of these comments is not to ‘prove’ that 
mainstream unionism see no distinction between the SDLP and Sinn Féin but rather 
to show that their view of the SDLP is not such that a model of citizenship can be 
built drawing a clear distinction between moderate nationalists who could be included 
as full citizens and militant republicans who would be excluded.  Mainstream 
unionism has a relatively undifferentiated view of northern nationalism as 
represented overwhelmingly by the SDLP and Sinn Féin.  They may morally 
distinguish between the two parties but when it comes to the key question of who 
can be admitted to the citizen-body the tendency is to treat both parties as being 
dangerous to the union. 
 
Other Ways of Defining the Enemy 
In addition to party labels there are other forms of ‘enemy’ identification used by 
mainstream unionism.  A focus on geographical areas is sometimes used to label 
those who are treated as non-citizens.  Numerous examples exist, listing most major 
centres of the nationalist population109. For example the ‘people’ of South Armagh 
are described as ‘dedicated terrorists’ by Ken Maginnis.110 Ivan Foster even includes 
the Malone Road as a ‘terrorist suburb’.111   Trimble in 1990 refers to areas with a 
‘predisposition’ to support terrorism.112  All residents of ‘nationalist’ areas are rejected 
for being active IRA supporters or being under the domination of the IRA and are 
therefore, for example, unfit to sit on juries according to McCartney.113 
 
Occasionally the mainstream unionist definition of the enemy is extended to include 
almost all those who are part of or seem as sympathetic to the nationalist 
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Stratton-Mills, UUP, House of Commons, 14 July 1972, vol. 840, col.  2135-6. 
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110House of Commons, 8 Dec. 1983, vol. 50, col.  520. 
111NI Assembly, 2 July 1985, vol. 16, p.485. 
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community.  Willie McCrea, in 1983, included Sean Neeson  of the Alliance Party 
among those whose loyalty was suspect, because he was a Catholic.114  Jim Allister 
claimed that the Alliance Party was suspect as it was chasing SDLP voters transfers 
in elections.115  The Roman Catholic church,116 including such clearly anti-IRA figures 
as Fr. Faul117 have been attacked as IRA supporters, with Cardinal Ó Fiaich singled 
out as ‘the IRA man from Crossmaglen’118 or the ‘Sinn Féin cardinal’.119  Kilfedder 
attacks the Catholic Bishops Commission for Justice and Peace, calling it ‘the Irish 
Roman Catholic Commission for Republican victory in Northern Ireland.’120  In the 
Northern Ireland Forum the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition has been called 
‘another arm of the pan-Nationalist front’,121 while Jack McKee (DUP) went further 
saying that ‘the peace people, the women’s coalition, the Alliance Party, Sinn Féin 
and the SDLP are all in the one pot of soup’.122 
 
Examples of mainstream unionist statements which clearly draw a line between 
constitutional nationalism and militant republicanism are few and far between.  
Paisley in 1984 said that it was ‘those people who by their vote have identified 
themselves with the IRA, whom we would tar with the IRA brush, but no one else.’123  
Raymond Ferguson says that ‘only Sinn Féin are categoric in their denial to unionists 
of their right to self-determination.  With this philosophy unionists can have no 
accommodation’, but he said it was worthwhile for unionists to look at the ‘real 
position’ of the SDLP and the Irish Government.124  Ken Maginnis in 1988 advocated 
‘a responsibility-sharing partnership of strictly constitutional politicians’.125  However, 
despite opposition by Maginnis, the UUP annual conference  in 1987 passed 
‘overwhelmingly’ a strong anti power sharing motion.126 
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These views are clearly in a minority position within mainstream unionist political 
elites and have been so over the 25 year period under examination.  While they do 
offer some contradictions of the overall position the overwhelming balance of 
numbers clearly points towards a relatively undifferentiated view of nationalism.  
Most mainstream unionists reject any possibility of seeing the SDLP as ‘fully 
legitimate’ as long as they have the ultimate goal of Irish unity.  It is the aspiration of 
the SDLP for Irish unity which puts them beyond the pale.  However much they 
condemn the IRA they cannot create a space for themselves within unionists view of 
what it is to be a citizen.  Occasionally unionists hold out the prospect that ‘ordinary’ 
Catholics are some sort of silent and loyal majority not represented by the parties 
they vote for, like the fictional ‘Uncle Tom’ but in their routine statements they treat 
all nationalists as suspect.. 
 
 
This position forms one of the clear dividing lines between mainstream unionism and 
more moderate unionists in the Alliance Party or the old UPNI.  The Alliance Party 
repeatedly says that the difference between the SDLP and Sinn Féin is 
‘fundamental’127 and ‘an unbridgeable gulf’128  but an aspiration to Irish unity is no 
barrier to involvement in constitutional politics and citizenship.129  There are within 
this broad view some qualifications even from moderate unionists.  All of them, for 
example, clearly exclude Sinn Féin from political negotiations despite their 
considerable electoral support. Sinn Féin voters are put outside the citizen camp, 
and have no claim to be represented, because of the political choices they have 
made.130  Morrell was also clear that in the event of another power-sharing executive, 
and if the RUC was controlled by that executive, then any party refusing to support 
the RUC would lose the right to be in government and also more drastically ‘forfeit 
the protection of the state’131.  Alliance also links power-sharing to support for the 
institutions of state, acceptance of the principle of consent and support for the RUC.  
Oliver Napier for example said ‘no party can legitimately be involved in the 
government of Northern Ireland, unless it recognises the legality of the state ... They 
must also give support to all the institutions of government.  Failure, for example, to 
give support to the police, I personally consider to be inconsistent with powersharing 
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... you cannot govern a country which you do not recognise and to which you refuse 
to give allegiance’.132 
 
The peace process of the 1990s has caused some difficulties for Alliance.  It is 
clearly a challenge to its political position of building a consensus in the ‘centre’, to 
exclude the ‘extremes’.  It has been very critical of what it saw as undue emphasis 
placed on the inclusion of Sinn Féin.  Alderdice in his conference speech of 1996 
argued that the ‘extremes’ were excluded in South Africa and the Middle East.  
‘Likewise in Northern Ireland we need to get agreement in the centre and exclude 
and marginalise extremes’.  This has led, at least at the rhetorical level to a shift in 
emphasis and perhaps a slight shift towards a mainstream unionist position with 
John Alderdice arguing that ‘many members of the SDLP have been let down to 
discover that his [John Hume’s] almost obsessional commitment to the republican 
peace agenda means that they might as well have voted for the extremists’.133  
However, fundamentally the Alliance Party’s view of citizenship is still one which 
includes fully moderate nationalists who accept the view that constitutional change 
can only come by majority vote, within Northern Ireland. 
 
Support for Security Forces - Re-Enforcing Enemy Status 
Criticism of the SDLP for their failure to support the RUC unambiguously or to 
encourage nationalist recruitment is used as another reason to withhold the status of 
full-citizen from the SDLP.  In this case the criticisms spans the entire unionist 
spectrum from the DUP to Alliance.  There is no recognition that the ethos of this 
force is unionist and that nationalists are alienated from it.  Low levels of Catholic 
recruitment are generally explained away as being due to IRA intimidation134 or due 
to the subversive nature of the nationalist community.135  There certainly is no 
evidence of any basis for negotiations which might lead to unionist support for, or 
acceptance of, fundamental reform of the security forces.  Indeed probably the most 
venomous attacks from unionists on constitutional nationalists are related to SDLP 
criticism’s of the RUC and UDR. 
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There are numerous examples of mainstream unionists accusing the SDLP of 
causing the deaths of members of the security forces by their refusal to lend support.   
Jim Molyneaux in 1980, attacking SDLP criticisms of the security forces  said 
‘vindictive accusations against the security forces are treated as an incitement to 
murder Army, UDR and RUC personnel ... those who engage in such vile 
propaganda are every bit as guilty as those who pull the trigger.’136  Frank Miller of 
the UUP said responsibility for the murder of members of the UDR was shared 
‘equally by those who pulled the trigger and by those politicians and church leaders 
who by their constant vilification have endangered the lives of every member of the 
UDR.’137  There is no recognition that nationalists may have legitimate grievances 
which prevent them supporting the RUC and UDR/RIR.   Their refusal to perform 
their duty is seen purely in terms of advancing their own political aims. 
 
This position has led unionists to dismiss any requirement even to consider RUC 
reform as part of the process of a political settlement. Paisley in 1991 listed as one of 
the key ‘unacceptable elements’ of the Brooke talks process the idea that the RUC 
was part of the problem.138  Ken Maginnis was very vocal in rejecting any public 
debate on the reform of the RUC in the aftermath of the 1994 IRA cease-fire,139 as 
was Jim Molyneaux140 and the DUP.141 
 
Unionists have repeatedly said that there can be no power-sharing of any sort 
without full support for the RUC.  In 1973 the UUP in a formal position paper rejected 
any power-sharing unless the SDLP supported the RUC.142  This position was very 
strongly advocated by ‘pledged’ unionists candidates and not just those opposed to 
power-sharing in any case.143  David Trimble in 1976 said that ‘no one has the right 
to be in a government unless they can give full allegiance to the Province and 
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publicly support the security forces’.144 Peter Robinson in 1989 insisted that ‘any 
party sharing responsibility for government should offer their full support to the 
security forces in Northern Ireland and encourage followers to support and even join 
them’.145  There are fewer specific public comments in the more recent period as 
power-sharing of any type seemed a remote possibility but William Ross returned to 
this theme shortly after the IRA cease-fire in 1994 saying that unless the SDLP take 
their seats on the Police Authority and seek to make the RUC acceptable to its 
supporters it cannot play a ‘responsible part’ in Northern Ireland.146 
 
Despite their attacks on the nationalist community for refusing to support the RUC, 
individual Catholics who have broken with their community and joined the RUC are 
regularly treated with suspicion.  While unionists have regularly attacked the SDLP 
for not taking seats on the Police Authority John McCrea of the Orange Order 
attacked proposals to have individual nationalists appointed, saying they would be a 
security risk.147  Following controversy over the rerouting of Orange parades 
attempting to march through nationalist areas of Cookstown in 1985 Alan Kane 
(DUP) attacked one of the most senior Catholic RUC officers, Chief Supt. Leo Dolan, 
saying that Dolan as ‘a Roman Catholic, a former neighbour of Owen Carron’s family 
... is no friend of the Protestant people’.148 Willie McCrea said Dolan was ‘an ardent 
Roman Catholic who has shown his hatred of Protestant parades in the past.  His 
removal should be forthcoming in order to ensure proper relations exist between the 
RUC and the people of Cookstown’.149  Following a similar incident in Portadown in 
August 1995 the Portadown branch of the UUP issued a formal statement attacking 
a senior Catholic officer, Bill McCreesh.150  In 1996 Peter Robinson, called on Hugh 
Annesley to weed out ‘Catholic moles’ in the RUC who Robinson accused of making 
‘nationalist’ comments to the media following newspaper coverage of sectarian 
harassment within the RUC.151 
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The Alliance Party though more temperate in its language is equally strong on the 
issue of policing.  This is the key and crucial issue where mainstream and moderate 
unionists are in full agreement.  The pattern of Alliance comments (with the 
exception of attacks on individual Catholic officers) follows the pattern of mainstream 
unionism.  Nationalists have a duty to support the RUC.  Nationalist criticisms of the 
RUC have been responsible for the deaths of security force members. There can be 
no power-sharing with parties who refuse to support the RUC.152  John Cushnahan 
said ‘it is mandatory for all parties who genuinely believe in the democratic process 
... to totally and unequivocally support the security forces’.153  Alliance also sees little 
need for fundamental reform of policing.  An Alliance Party policy statement in 1995, 
rejected the idea of major structural changes in the RUC, focusing instead on 
changes at the governmental level and in dealing with individual complaints.154  The 
Alliance Party Manifesto in 1997 talks of RUC reform in very minimalist language, 
with no discussion on the overall ethos and ideology of the force. 
 
Unionism, mainstream or moderate, does not accept that there are genuine grounds 
for grievance by which nationalists could justify their withholding of support from the 
RUC.  They accuse nationalists of failing in a fundamental duty of citizenship and 
therefore feel justified in withholding full, inclusive citizenship rights from nationalists.  
Yet reform of policing is absolutely central to any conceivable model of ‘parity of 
esteem’ which is likely to have any impact on the political situation.  Policing is one of 
the most ‘structural’ of the issues of inequality.  It is also, one of the most important 
from the perspective of the nationalist community.  However, there is no evidence 
whatsoever that any significant grouping of unionist political elites is willing to engage 
on this issue. 
 
Proposals which assume that the most likely outcome is the creation of some sort of 
common cause between moderate unionists and moderate nationalists, excluding 
more militant groups on either side, have seriously underplayed the extent to which 
mainstream unionism sees constitutional nationalism not just as a rival but as 
subversive.  The relatively undifferentiated approach of mainstream unionism to 
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nationalist political groups means that unionist elites are unlikely to make the sort of 
calculations implicit in a ‘middle-ground’ solution.  Unionists elites still see the 
SDLP’s political stance as fundamentally dangerous to their position.  Including 
nationalists within the body-politic will not lead them to support the state, rather 
mainstream unionist believe it would give them a foothold to destroy it. 
 
This is crucial for any analysis of the potential for peace-building.  As long as 
mainstream unionism sees relatively few distinctions between the SDLP and Sinn 
Féin they will not be persuaded to agree terms for a political settlement in opposition 
to Sinn Féin, on any basis which the SDLP might conceivable agree to.  Mainstream 
unionism in order to engage in any form of meaningful dialogue must reformulate its 
attitude to the nationalist community either to reach agreement with them as a group 
- Sinn Féin included - or seek to draw the sort of clear distinctions between Sinn Féin 
and the SDLP which would allow them to offer the types of compromises necessary 
to reach agreement with the SDLP, without boosting Sinn Féin’s support at the 
SDLP’s expense.  At present there is little evidence of a move in either direction 
 
PEACE MOVEMENTS AND PEACE PROCESSES: ‘WAR BY OTHER MEANS’155 
The mainstream unionist view on security and citizenship is a complex product of the 
unsettled nature of the state, their attitude to the British Government, Irish 
Government and northern nationalists, their conditional loyalty and their emphasis in 
common with many settler colonial situations of their own loyalty compared to 
nationalists’ disloyalty. It is not purely a response to armed action.  The mainstream 
unionist view of citizenship is such that the mere absence of armed political conflict 
will not in itself be likely to shift their position significantly.   The peace process of the 
1990s is certainly the most significant and hopeful development of the last 25 years, 
but there have been other attempts and mainstream unionist elites have been 
consistently suspicious, if not hostile to each of them.  Moves towards IRA cease-
fires have invariably been seen as having been purchased at a price and as being 
likely to hastened moves towards political reform rather than prevent them. 
 
It is hardly surprising, then, with this historical context that unionists saw the 1994 
IRA cease-fire and peace process and a threat to their position.  David Trimble said 
just prior to the cease-fire that ‘many of us regard that process as being entirely 
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bogus for it involves making political concessions to terrorism’.156  Paisley said: ‘we 
are not dealing with a pure and meaningful peace process.  We are dealing with a 
strategy that the IRA is using very successfully to achieve its eventual end .. the 
troubles are, alas, not over.  As I have said all sorts of other attacks are being 
made’.157  Robert McCartney in his first speech in the House of Commons said: 
 
 In Northern Ireland the peace process is seen primarily as a mechanism for 
protecting Great Britain’s economic interests rather than as one designed 
essentially to secure a democratic and permanent peace in Northern Ireland 
... The peace process is viewed as a disguise for marketing a political 
settlement acceptable to the two sovereign powers, regardless of how 
unpalatable it may be to the pro-Union majority.158 
 
The following January, just before the IRA cease-fire broke down, McCartney said: 
‘in a reversal of the Clasewitizian principle that war is politics by other means, we are 
seeing politics utilised as war by other means’.159 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Unionist political elites’ views on security highlight key aspects of their models of 
citizenship.  Mainstream unionism’s viewpoint has six crucial elements.   
 
Firstly, debate on security and on political change is seen as a regime threatening 
(Lustick 1993:42-3).  Discussing the possibility of change increases instability and 
undermines the state.  The only safe response is to seek to re-establish unionist 
hegemony.  Secondly, the British Government is seen as an unwilling and 
undependable ally.  They are seen as having no will to defeat the threat from Irish 
nationalism. Since the British Government has control over the security forces, the 
unionists see the conflict as asymmetric - with the will of Irish nationalism to win far 
stronger and more fundamental than the British government’s desire to avoid defeat.  
Mainstream unionism thus defines their British citizenship in qualified and conditional 
terms.  They are loyal to the British state only for so long as the British state upholds 
the Union and the unionist position in Northern Ireland.  Mainstream unionists 
reserve the right to withdraw their consent to be governed by the British government, 
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drawing on models of citizenship which emphasis a covenant between people and 
government.  This conditional loyalty reaffirms the importance of the distinction which 
the state has made, since the original colonial settler-native divide between disloyal 
nationalists and loyal unionists.  Mainstream unionists view this distinction as so 
fundamental that they would upturn their loyalty to the British state in order to defend 
their position vis a vis nationalists as they see such shifts in the balance of power 
and resources between nationalists and unionists as eventually taking them out of 
the British state in any case. 
 
Thirdly, mainstream unionist elites have a relatively undifferentiated view of 
nationalists.  Both constitutional nationalism and republicanism, SDLP and Sinn Féin 
are seen as threatening.  The model of citizenship therefore becomes very 
exclusionary: almost all nationalists are excluded from full citizenship, all are seen as 
fifth columnists or enemy aliens, dangerous by virtue of their group identity and 
political aspirations. 
 
Fourtly, mainstream unionist elites reject any criticism of the RUC and the security 
forces generally.  There is no acceptance that there is any need for significant reform 
of the core values and ethos of the force.  Therefore nationalists are seen as having 
no justification whatsoever for withholding support from the RUC.  Defending the 
state, and supporting those who have been entrusted with that job on a day to day 
basis, is seen as a fundamental duty of citizenship.  As nationalists have failed this 
duty they will inevitably lose some rights of citizenship too. 
 
The Alliance model of citizenship sets them a significantly different set of security 
priorities.  Alliance rejects the idea of re-establishing unionist hegemony, arguing that 
constitutional nationalists must be included within the body politic if there is to be a 
stable peace. Moderate nationalists and unionists are included as citizens while the 
‘extremes’ of republicanism and loyalism are excluded.  Alliance makes a clear, 
indeed a fundamental distinction between the SDLP and Sinn Féin.  Alliance’s vision 
of a settlement is based on assumptions about the political priorities of the two 
communities and the relative rights or majority and minority communities.  Unionism 
sees the Union as fundamental, and as a majority has the right to set the 
constitutional framework of the state.  Nationalists as a minority cannot veto such 
decisions but do have a right to be governed in ways they find acceptable and would 
in practice, Alliance believe, prioritise ‘fair treatment’ over constitutional change. 
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Alliance’s viewpoint on the RUC is, however, virtually indistinguishable in its 
fundamentals from the mainstream unionist position.  There is no acceptance that 
the RUC is part of the problem.  Support for the RUC is seen as a crucial test of 
citizenship.  On a pragmatic level it is seen as crucial to win any UUP support for 
power-sharing with the SDLP.  Nationalists must support the RUC if they are to be 
admitted to full citizenship or to any form of government. 
 
This paper has highlighted a relatively unchanging viewpoint within both mainstream 
and moderate unionism over the past 25 years.  This is not to deny some changes of 
style and substance over the period.  Mainstream unionism is now in a position 
where it has to put its case to an international audience.  It must seek to persuade 
US policy makers, British MPs, British public opinion and even the Irish Government 
and Southern public that they have a defensible case.  Despite this there is little 
evidence of any fundamental shift in unionist thinking.  There is no sign that unionist 
political elites as a bloc are capable, yet, of redefining their view of citizenship to 
accommodate even constitutional nationalists, not to talk of Sinn Féin voters.  
Neither is there any evidence of an emerging split within mainstream unionism to 
create a party with a more inclusive vision.  The argument here is not that unionism 
is unchanging or a monolith but rather that while unionism has and can adapt to new 
circumstances there is no internal dynamic within unionism or no view of citizenship 
and security which could form the basis of a settlement at this time.  Moderate 
unionism within unionist political elites is now effectively reduced to the Alliance 
Party: their vision has remained largely unchanged, but there is no evidence that 
they are winning any further support. 
 
Mainstream unionist political elites entering political negotiations will still bring with 
them a view of citizenship which sees all reform as threatening to the constitutional 
status quo.  They will see all nationalists as a relatively undifferentiated enemy.  
They will see the duty of defending the state, and the RUC as a force, as utterly 
central to their position.  They reserve the right to withdraw their consent to be 
governed if a solution is pursued against their will.  The mainstream unionist model 
of security and citizenship may not be the most optimistic starting point for 
negotiations for a political settlement but negotiations about issues of equality and 
for a political settlement cannot progress unless there is a clear understanding  of 
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the unionist position.  Only with such an understanding is there any prospect of 
persuading them to shift to a new and more inclusive view. 
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